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1 Introduction
Three concerns underly all research on income inequality and eco-
nomic growth. First, inequality might be causal for growth, raising
or lowering an economy’s growth rate. Understanding the mechanism
then becomes paramount. How do alternative structures of political
economy and taxation matter for this relation between inequality and
growth? Does income inequality increase the rate of capital invest-
ment and therefore growth? Do credit and capital market imper-
fections magnify potentially adverse impacts of inequality, thereby
worsening economic performance and growth? For concreteness, I
will refer to this circle of related questions as the mechanism concern.
Second, even as economic growth occurs, the simultaneous rise
in inequality—sometimes hypothesized, other times asserted—might
be so steep that the very poor suﬀer a decline in their incomes.
This is one of a set of beliefs underlying the anti-capitalism, anti-
globalization, anti-growth movement. Although, not exhaustively
descriptive, anti-globalization is the term I will use to refer to this
second concern.
I thank the MacArthur Foundation for ﬁnancial support. I have
received many helpful suggestions from colleagues, including Abhi-
jit Banerjee, Tim Besley, Richard Blundell, Andrew Chesher, Frank
Cowell, Bill Easterly, Theo Eicher, Raquel Fernandez, Chico Ferreira,
James Feyrer, Oded Galor, Cecilia Garc´ia-Pen˜alosa, Louise Keely,
and Branko Milanovic. Also useful were Clarissa Yeap’s research as-
sistance in the early stages of this work and Claudia Biancotti’s Ec473
LSE seminar presentation, in the spring of 2001. All calculations and
graphs were produced using LATEX and the author’s econometrics shell
tsrf.
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Third is an all-else category of analyses that fall outside the ﬁrst
two. This incorporates concerns such as envy, equity, risk, peer group
eﬀects, or the economics of superstars (where the distribution of out-
comes turns out more skewed than that of the important underlying
characteristics). Thus, this category includes the more traditional
motivations in research on income distribution and inequality, but
that have become less emphasized in recent research that focus more
on the mechanism and anti-globalization concerns.
This paper is part of a body of research that argues that the mech-
anism and anti-globalization concerns are empirically untenable. It
seeks to sharpen the general points made in Quah (2001b) by concen-
trating on the world’s two most populous nation states, China and
India—only two points in a cross-country analysis, but fully one-third
of the world’s population.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes related literature, and Section 3 develops the class of prob-
ability models underlying the approach in this paper. Sections 4–5
present the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. The technical
appendix, Section 7, contains details on the estimation and data.
2 Related literature
A conventional wisdom recently emerged from empirical research on
inequality and growth is how fragile empirical ﬁndings are, varying
with auxiliary conditioning information, functional form speciﬁcation,
assumed patterns of causality, and so on (e.g., Banerjee and Duﬂo,
2000).
This state of aﬀairs is unlike that at the beginnings of the sub-
ject. Then, Kuznets (1955) had asked if personal income inequality
increased or declined in the course of economic growth. He doc-
umented both: looking across countries, from poorest to richest,
within-country income inequality ﬁrst rose and then fell.
Since most of the work there entailed deﬁning and collecting data,
it was painstaking and laborious. By contrast, modern researchers
now using readily-available observations on growth and inequality can
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easily and routinely re-examine Kuznets’s inverted U-shaped curve
(e.g., Deininger and Squire, 1998). Interest therefore has shifted
to more subtle issues: causality and mechanisms relating inequality
and growth—see, e.g., Aghion, Caroli and Garc´ia-Pen˜alosa (1999),
Be´nabou (1996), Galor and Zeira (1993), and the literature surveyed
in Bertola (1999).
On these more complex questions, however, the data have given
a less clearcut message. Results have varied, depending on auxiliary
conditioning information and econometric technique. For instance,
Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Perotti (1996), and Persson and Tabellini
(1994) concluded that inequality and growth are negatively related,
while Barro (2000), Forbes (2000), and Li and Zou (1998) reported
a positive or varying relation. To some researchers, the situation
has seemed so bad that they have simply concluded the data are not
informative for interesting issues in inequality and growth, and have
attempted to explain why this is so, within a particular model of
inequality and growth (e.g., Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2000). In this view
the data are noisy.
This paper takes no explicit stance on causality between inequality
and growth, nor on the functional form relating them. Instead, it
models inequality and growth jointly as part of a vector stochastic
process, and calibrates the impact each has on a range of welfare
indicators and on the individual income distributions—ﬁrst within
China and India and then taking the two countries together. The
paper addresses simpler questions than those treated in the ambitious
work attempting to trace out causality across growth and inequality.
This paper asks, when growth occurs, how do the poor fare? What
diﬀerence have the historical dynamics of inequality and growth made
for the incomes of one third of the world’s population? If inequality
were, indeed, to fall when growth is lower, does it fall enough to
overcome the negative impact on the poor of slower economic growth
overall? Alternatively, if within-country inequality were to rise, does
that occur simultaneously with Chinese and India per capita incomes
converging, so that overall individual income inequality across these
two economies is falling?
Given the data extant, arithmetic alone suﬃces to retrieve use-
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ful answers to these questions. Here, the data are loud, not noisy:
For a universe comprising China and India—one third of the world—
for understanding the secular dynamics of personal incomes against
a setting of cross-country inequalities, those forces of ﬁrst-order im-
portance are macroeconomic ones determining national patterns of
growth and convergence. Rising average incomes dominate every-
thing else. Within-country inequality dynamics are insigniﬁcant for
determining inequality across people internationally.
Several earlier papers motivate my approach here. Deininger and
Squire (1998) addressed questions closely related to those I pose
above. They used regression analysis and more elaborate data, in
contrast to the minimalist, arithmetic approach of this paper. They
concluded, though, much the same as I do below: The poor ben-
eﬁt more from increasing aggregate growth by a range of factors,
than from reducing inequality through redistribution. Deininger and
Squire’s view of growth and inequality as the joint outcome of some
underlying, unobserved development process matches that in Section
3 below.
Dollar and Kraay (2001) studied directly average incomes of the
poorest ﬁfth of the population across many diﬀerent economies. They
noted those incomes rise proportionally with overall average incomes,
for a wide range of factors generating economic growth. Put dif-
ferently, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd anything raising average incomes that
doesn’t also increase incomes for the very poor. They concluded, as
I will below, that the poor beneﬁt from aggregate economic growth,
whatever is driving the latter. Similarly, Ravallion and Chen (1997)
found in survey data that changes in inequality are orthogonal to
changes in average living standards.
All these papers, in my interpretation, point to a consistent, quan-
titatively important characterization of the relation between growth
and inequality. The characterization is one naturally viewed in terms
of Fig. 2 below, and rounded out by the arithmetic calculations in
this paper and in Quah (2001b).
More recent papers are related as well. Bourguignon (2001) per-
formed calculations like those in Section 7.4.1 below. Sala-i-Martin
(2002) uses within-country income shares as vector I (section 3 be-
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low), and therefore is able to specialize the calculations from what
I give in sections 3 and 7. Although his techniques and emphases
diﬀer from those in this paper and in Quah (2001b), our motivations
and conclusions are close, and complement each other’s. Finally, Hes-
ton and Summers (1999), Milanovic (2002), and Sala-i-Martin (2002)
constructed world income distributions—i.e., across over a hundred
countries, not just those for the two I use here—but that similarly put
together individual country statistics. Their methods, approaches,
and data sources diﬀer from mine, but the underlying ideas are the
same.
Critics of this work have pointed out that income inequality statis-
tics such as Gini coeﬃcients, 90/10 ratios, mean/median income
ratio, log standard deviations, and so on were never intended for
examining the kinds of issues that I treat below nor for merging
with the per capita income and population measures that I analyze.
Thus, for instance, more detailed investigations into the very poor
in any single country, made possible from surveys, ﬁeld research or
other individual-level microeconomic data, could well display tenden-
cies diﬀerent from those I derive—see, e.g., Atkinson and Brandolini
(2001) or Dreze and Sen (1995). My calculations then, it is asserted,
do no more than reveal the misleading nature of many income in-
equality statistics.
Perhaps so. However, it is also exactly these same statistics with
which Be´nabou (1996) begins his powerful and inﬂuential statement
on how inequality matters importantly in economic growth—merging
inequality and aggregate statistics, comparing Korea and the Philip-
pines, in a similar spirit to what I do below. If measures like those I
use mislead, then all such research is ﬂawed (which I don’t believe)—
not just those studies, like the current one, that argue inequality is
unimportant. The single set of data that we all use has diﬀerent di-
mensions to it, and we cannot selectively ignore some and heed only
others—thereby imposing biases based on whether certain conclusions
seem a priori sensible.
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3 Probability models for income distribution dynamics
Fix a country at a point in time, and let Y denote income, I a vector
of income inequality measures, and F the distribution of Y across
individuals. One entry in I might be the Gini coeﬃcient; another
might be the mean-median income ratio; yet a third might be the
standard deviation of log incomes; further entries might be (within-
country) income shares; and so on. Each element of I is a functional
or a statistic of the distribution F. To emphasize that per capita
income is the arithmetic mean or expectation of F, write it as E .
Economic growth is E˙/E .
Asking about causality between growth and inequality is asking
about the functions
E˙/E = φ(I) or (I) = ψ(E˙/E)
(as in, e.g., Fig. 1). If that is the interest, econometric analysis can
trace out φ and ψ.
By contrast, this paper models E˙/E and I jointly, taking them
to be elements of equal standing in a vector stochastic process Z.
Let Z0 denote the vector of other variables in the system, including
population P , so that
{Z(t) : t ≥ 0} , with Z def=

E˙/EI
Z0


constitutes the object to investigate. The current study can be viewed
as describing an unrestricted vector autoregression in Z; it makes no
assumptions on causality relations across the diﬀerent entries of Z.
The law of motion describing the dynamics of the income distribu-
tion F implies a law of motion for the vector Z. Conversely, when
Z0 is suﬃciently extensive, Z’s dynamics imply F’s; when Z0 is not
complete, Z’s dynamics restrict but do not fully specify F’s.
Fig. 2 illustrates this. The right side shows the density f corre-
sponding to the distribution F, at two time points t0 and t1, with
the dashed line indicating f at t0, the earlier time, and the solid line
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Inequality
Growth
Fig. 1: Inequality and growth Does one systematically co-move
with the other? Does one cause the other?
{Z(t) : t ≥ 0} ⇐⇒
f(Y )
YY
f0
f1
E1E0
Fig. 2: Income distribution dynamics Vector Z’s law of motion
implies and is implied by income distribution dynamics. Densities f0
and f1 are for times t0 and t1 respectively, with t0 < t1.
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indicating that at timepoint t1. Associated with f0 is its mean E0; sim-
ilarly, associated with f1 is its mean E1. Fig. 2 has, as an illustration,
E1 > E0 so that economic growth, as measured by national income
statistics, has occurred. If Y is some arbitrary but ﬁxed income level,
we can estimate the fraction of the population that remains with in-
come below Y by calculating
∫
Y≤Y f(Y ) dY from knowledge of f, from
time t0 to time t1. If we know the population P as well, then we can
use this calculation to estimate the number of people living at incomes
less than Y . In the inequality literature, the statistic
∫
Y≤Y f(Y ) dY
is sometimes called the poverty headcount index, and written HCY ;
while the size of the population with incomes at most Y is written
PY (e.g., equations (14) and (15) in Section 7 below).
The problem is we typically have only incomplete information on
Z and f. But we can use knowledge on Z to infer restrictions on f,
and then estimate statistics of interest like HCY and PY .
To illustrate the idea, suppose F were assumed (or otherwise in-
ferred) to be Pareto, and known up to the two parameters θ1 and
θ2:
F(y) = 1− (θ1y−1)θ2 , θ1 > 0, y ≥ θ1, θ2 > 1. (1)
What restrictions does knowledge of Z imply for F? Equation (1)
gives per capita income E and Gini coeﬃcient IG as
E def=
∫ ∞
−∞
y dF(y) = (θ2 − 1)−1θ2θ1,
IG def=
[
2−1E(F)]−1 ∫ ∞
−∞
(
F(y)− 1
2
)
y dF(y) = (2θ2 − 1)−1,
so that knowledge of the ﬁrst two entries of Z alone gives
θˆ2 = (1 + IG−1)/2,
θˆ1 = (1− θˆ−12 )E .
With more information in Z, the researcher can either estimate θ
more precisely, using a method of moments technique as described in
Section 7.1 below, or alternatively, relax the Pareto assumption for F.
In either case, HCY and PY can then be straighforwardly estimated.
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time
Income distributions
t t+ s
Fig. 3: Emerging twin peaks Cross-country per capita income
distribution. Arrows show countries transiting across diﬀerent parts
of the cross section distribution.
Putting together the implied F’s for diﬀerent countries in the
world would allow mapping the worldwide income distribution (Quah,
2001b). To appreciate the value of doing this, consider Fig. 3, which
shows what has sometimes been referred to as an emerging twin peaks
in cross-country income distribution dynamics (e.g., Quah, 2001a).
This twin-peaks characterization, as many others in the macroeco-
nomic growth literature, takes a country as a unit of observation.
Thus, countries as large as China are treated the same way as those
as small as Singapore, and income distributions within countries are
ignored—the analysis takes everyone in the economy to have the same
(per capita, average) income.
Information on income distributions within a country allow en-
riching the picture in Fig. 3 to something like Fig. 4. The black
dots at time t indicate the per capita incomes of two hypothetical
countries, with the darker shaded area around each depicting within-
country individual income distributions. Thus, even as national per
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time
Income distributions
t t+ s
Fig. 4: Individual income distributions Distribution dynamics
within the emerging twin-peaks law that describes cross-country per
capita income cross sections.
capita incomes evolve according to an emergent twin-peaks dynamic
law, the distribution of incomes across people, within and across coun-
tries, can evolve and overlap in intricate ways.
4 China and India
China and India—although only two countries out of over a hundred
in Fig. 3—carry within them a third of the world’s population. They
thus provide substantial insight into the dynamics in Fig. 4.
Table 1 records that between 1980 and 1992 China’s per capita
income grew from US$972 to US$1493, an annual growth rate of
3.58%. Over this period, India grew at a lower annual rate of 3.12%,
increasing its per capita income from US$882 to US$1282. (Per capita
incomes are purchasing power parity adjusted real GDP per capita
in constant dollars at 1985 prices, series rgdpch from Summers and
–10–
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Per capita incomes (US$) Population (×106)
1980 1992 E˙/E 1980 1992
China 972 1493 3.58% 981 1162
India 882 1282 3.12% 687 884
US 15295 17945 1.33% 228 255
Table 1: Aggregate income and population dynamics. China, India,
and the US
Gini coeﬃcient IG
1980 1992 Min. (year)
China 0.32 0.38 0.26 (1984)
India 0.32 0.32 0.30 (1990)
US 0.35 0.38 0.35 (1982)
Table 2: Inequality in China, India, and the US, by Gini coeﬃcient
(from Deininger and Squire, 1996)
Heston (1991).) For comparison, Table 1 also contains a row for the
US, showing its 1.33% annual growth over 1980–1992, taking per US
capita income from US$15295 to US$17945. The last two columns of
Table 1 contain population ﬁgures, again from Summers and Heston
(1991). By 1992, China had grown to over 1.1 billion people, with
India approaching 0.9 billion.
It has been remarked many times elsewhere that China’s fast-
increasing per capita income came together with rises in inequality.
Table 2 shows Gini coeﬃcients for the same three countries, China,
India, and the US, over 1980–1992. Inequality in China, as measured
by the Gini coeﬃcient, increased from 0.32 to 0.38, while that in In-
dia remained constant at 0.32. While the last column of the Table
shows the increase in China’s inequality is not monotone and India’s
inequality was not constant throughout—China had its low Gini co-
eﬃcient of 0.26 over this period in 1984, while India’s low was 0.30
in 1990—it is tempting to conclude from looking cross-sectionally at
China and India that a fast-growing economy also has its inequality
rise rapidly, while a slower-growing economy can keep inequality in
–11–
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Y = 2; HCY (PY , 106)
1980 1992
China 0.37–0.54 (360–530) 0.14–0.17 (158–192)
India 0.48–0.62 (326–426) 0.12–0.19 (110–166)
Table 3: Fraction of population and number of people with incomes
less than US$2 per day. The range of estimates spans the diﬀerent
distributional assumptions described in Section 7.4.
check.
But what do Tables 1 and 2 imply for, say, the number of people
in China and India living below a speciﬁc ﬁxed income level? How
rapidly were people exiting low-income states, given aggregate growth
and actual changes in measured inequality? If, counterfactually, in-
equality had remained unchanged, how would aggregate growth alone
have changed conditions for the poor? Or, again counterfactually,
how much would inequality have had to increase, for the poor not to
have beneﬁted at all from aggregate growth?
Tables 3 and 4 provide answers to these questions, obtained using
the calculations detailed below in Section 7. First, from the actual
historical record in per capita income growth (E˙/E), population, and
Gini coeﬃcients, we can, with weak additional assumptions on the
parametric form of density f, work out how the entire distribution of
individual income shifted between 1980 and 1992. Table 3 shows how
the situation for the very poor changed over this time period. The
fraction of the population living on less than US$2 per day (US$730
annually) varied from 0.37 to 0.54 in China in 1980; this corresponded
to between 360m to 530m people.1 By 1992, the fraction of popula-
tion in that income range had fallen to 0.14 to 0.17, implying only
between 158m to 192m people, given the population size then. In
other words, over 1980–1992 China reduced the population in this
very poor income range by between 210m to 338m people, even as
1 Each entry in the Table is a range rather than just a single
number since alternative distributional assumptions can be used in
the calculation; see Section 7.4 below.
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IG, P constant: −P˙Y HCY constant: I˙G/IG
China 33m/year 8.3%/year
India 17m/year 8.8%/year
Table 4: From 1980 perspective: Given aggregate growth, reduction
in numbers of poor if inequality unchanged, and proportional inequal-
ity increase per year to maintain poverty numbers
inequality and total population rose.
The situation for India is less surprising, as measured inequality
there remained constant, and only aggregate economic growth oc-
curred.2 But since the total Indian population also rose, it might
well have been that the poor did increase in number. Table 3 shows
that did not happen. Between 1980 and 1992, the number of Indians
living on less than US$2 a day fell from 326m–426m to less than half
that, 110m–166m. The fraction of the Indian population in this in-
come range fell from approximately half to perhaps one-ﬁfth, likely
less. India reduced the population living in the very poor income
range by about a quarter of a billion, a number comparable to the
change in China.
If the world comprised only China and India put together, it would
show a number of interesting features. First, the country that grew
faster on aggregate also had inequality rise more—the upward-sloping
schedule in Fig. 1 is that that is relevant. Second, however, even
despite this positive relation between growth and inequality, overall
the world’s poor beneﬁted dramatically from economic growth. Over
the course of little more than a decade, about half a billion people—
out of a total population across the two countries of about 1.6 to 1.9
billion—exited the state of extreme poverty. This decline in sheer
numbers of the very poor divided about equally between China and
India.
Table 4 takes the argument further. Suppose population were held
2 See again, however, the discussion at the end of section 2 and
the more detailed picture available from studies such as Dreze and
Sen (1995).
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constant at 1980 levels in China and India. The left panel in the table
shows that if inequality too were held constant at its 1980 levels, then
aggregate growth alone would have removed from being very poor
33m people a year in China, and 17m people a year in India. The
right panel shows that to keep constant the number of people living
on incomes less than US$2 a day as aggregate growth proceeded, the
Gini coeﬃcient would have had to rise at a proportional growth rate
of 8.3% per year in China, and 8.8% per year in India. Such rapid
and large increases in inequality are unprecedented in world history.3
China’s increase in inequality would have had to more than double,
and be kept at that rate for a dozen years, to nullify the beneﬁcial
eﬀects of its high aggregate growth rate.
I conclude from the discussion here that, given the historical ex-
perience in China and India, aggregate economic growth might well
come about only with increases in inequality. However, given mag-
nitudes that are historically reasonable, growth is unambiguously
beneﬁcial—especially for the poor in general, and even for the poor
in particular when inequality rises.
5 Extensions
This section expands on the discussion in Section 4 above. It provides
further quantiﬁcation and illustration to the conclusions there.
3 The only possible exceptions are the transition economies and
Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union: see, e.g., Ivaschenko
(2001) and Shorrocks and Kolenikov (2001). The seven instances that
Li, Squire and Zou (1998) identiﬁed with statistically and quantita-
tively signiﬁcant time trends in Gini coeﬃcients only saw proportional
growth rates of 1.02% (Australia), 1.04% (Chile), 3.18% (China),
−1.71% (France), −1.18% (Italy), 1.61% (New Zealand), and 1.46%
(Poland) [this author’s calculations, from Table 4 in Li, Squire and
Zou (1998)] taken linearly over a single time period—multiple time
periods would imply yet smaller growth rates.
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Deininger and Squire (1996), Li, Squire and Zou (1998), and Quah
(2001b) have presented calculations formalizing how most of the vari-
ation in measured inequality is across countries. Inequality changes
hardly at all in time. It is not that inequality—for physical reasons
or otherwise—cannot vary much; it is that the workings of economies
lead to inequality hardly changing through time. Honduras’s 1968
income inequality of 62% (Gini coeﬃcient) is 2.4 times that of Bel-
gium’s 26% in 1985. But at the same time, over the entire post-War
era, income inequality in Belgium never rose above 28% while Hon-
duras’s never fell below 50%.
This fact has implications for panel data analyses of inequality
and growth (Quah, 2001b). Panel data econometric methods that
condition out individual eﬀects—almost all do—end up removing all
the important variation in inequality data. Moreover, since economic
growth has its principal variation in the orthogonal direction—in
time rather than across countries (e.g., Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett
and Summers, 1993)—panel data methods shoehorn inequality and
growth data into spuriously better ﬁt with each other. In other words,
econometric methods that condition out individual eﬀects represent
here a methodologically-suspect attempt to remove statistical biases.
That justiﬁcation has often been simply imported from other ﬁelds
of economics, without due attention to why applying such techniques
to study inequality and growth might be inappropriate.
From Table 3 we concluded that China and India together reduced
the number of people living on less than US$2 a day by between 36m
and 50m each year. Fig. 5 graphs this same reduction from 1980
to 1992 in the number of people with incomes less than US$2 per
day, given the actual historical outcomes in income inequality and
economic growth. China and India alone shifted 508m people, more
than 12% of the world’s population, about one-third of the world’s
then-poor, out of poverty.
Fig. 6 shows, for each economy, the amount of poverty reduction
per year that would have occurred from aggregate growth alone, had
inequality and population size remained constant at their 1980 values.
Obviously, the faster is economic growth, the faster would PY fall.
The Fig. emphasizes that to reduce poverty worldwide it is in the very
–15–
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PY , 106
t
200
400
1980 1992
Fig. 5: Estimated absolute poverty reduction Each country is
a single dot, one each for 1980 and for 1992—with height equal to the
average of PY across the distributional assumptions for F described
in Section 7.4. The sum total across China and India in 1980 is 821m;
in 1992, 313m.
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−P˙Y , 106/year
E˙/E0 2.0 4.0 6.0
20
40
Fig. 6: Growth alone Each country is a single dot, with height
equal to the arithmetic average of −P˙Y , 106/year across distribu-
tional assumptions for F described in Section 7.4.
large economies like China and India where high growth is needed.
Fig. 7 shows, again for each economy, the proportional growth
rate of inequality that would be required to nullify the beneﬁts of
growth, had population remained constant at its 1980 value. The
dark dots towards the bottom of the Fig. shows the actual growth rate
in inequality that occurred over the sample. (These numbers would
be lower than those in footnote 3, for the multiple/single timeperiod
reason described there.) Counterfactual increases in inequality of the
magnitude that would be needed to overcome the poverty-reducing
impact of economic growth—the upper part of the picture, in light
dots—are far outside the range of historical realization.
Quah (2001b) presents counterparts of Figs. 5–7 for the 100 or
so countries for which data are available. The conclusions above are
reinforced; unsurprisingly, China and India dominate the picture.
–17–
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I˙G/IG
E˙/E0 2.0 4.0 6.0
4.0
8.0
Fig. 7: Inequality to nullify growth Each country is a single
dot. The light dots have height equal to the arithmetic average of
I˙G/IG across distributional assumptions for F described in Section
7.4. The dark dots show actual I˙G/IG realized.
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6 Conclusions
Much recent research on inequality and growth has taken one of two
possible approaches: The ﬁrst is explicit, and that is to see if inequal-
ity causes growth. The second, typically left implicit, is to see if, even
as growth occurs, the poor might be disadvantaged anyway, because
inequality has risen so dramatically. This paper has shown that for
China and India—only two points in a cross section but one third
of the world’s population—neither of these possibilities is empirically
tenable.
More traditional motivations—risk, poverty, equity—for studying
inequality, however, remain. Indeed, they are reinforced as worldwide
inequality continues to evolve, driven by powerful economic forces.
But these motivations have little to do with the more recent analyses
of the relation between inequality and growth.
This paper has applied a simple arithmetic approach to obtain
its ﬁndings. It has asked, given historical patterns of growth and in-
equality, how have income distributions within the each of and across
China and India evolved? How have the poor fared in the two coun-
tries as per capita incomes and rich-poor diﬀerences have changed?
Whether the growth and inequality data are unable to speak clearly
on questions of causality or whether they only imply weak empirical
relations, the data are unequivocal on the questions I posed. The
data are loud, not noisy.
The principal ﬁnding of the paper is two-fold: First, only under
inconceivably high increases in inequality would economic growth not
beneﬁt the poor. The magnitudes of improvement in living standards
due to aggregate economic growth simply overwhelm any putative
deterioration due to increases in inequality. Second, any mechanism
where inequality causes economic growth, positively or negatively, is
empirically irrelevant for determining outcomes for individual income
distributions. I have obtained these results for China and India in this
paper. A complete study—rounding out the remaining two-thirds left
over from the title of this paper—is in Quah (2001b).
This paper has taken care to assume no single view on the causal
mechanisms relating inequality and growth. It has pointed out that
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whatever it is that drives economic growth in the large, those forces—
be they macroeconomic, technological, political, or institutional—are
dramatically important for improving the lot of the poor when they
lead to economic growth. And similarly so in the opposite direction
when they lead to economic stagnation.
What might seem an appealing possibility to raise here is that in-
come inequality could, positively or negatively, truly cause aggregate
economic growth, so that this paper’s principal ﬁnding would then
only reinforce the importance of distributional and inequality con-
cerns over macroeconomic growth. However, even in reduced-form
regressions of growth on inequality, the R2 ﬁt can never be very high:
The directions of principal variation in the two variables are just
too diﬀerent (Quah, 2001b). Therefore, even in the best of circum-
stances, even with no ambiguity on the direction of causality, many
other factors beyond inequality inﬂuence economic growth. And all
of them, through their impact on the aggregate income level, aﬀect
the poor—independently of inequality’s eﬀect on economic growth.
Finally, it is not a telling criticism of the work in this paper to
say that because it uses Gini coeﬃcients or other standard inequality
measures, it does not get at the true nature of inequality, whatever
that might mean. Because the paper’s methods characterize the en-
tire income distribution, the focus on speciﬁc inequality measures is
only for practicaly convenience, not conceptual necessity. However,
precisely the same measures are used in all other studies of growth
and inequality I know—in particular, in the many regression stud-
ies that claim to show one causal relation or another between these
two quantities. If the data used are inappropriate here, then they
are similarly so there too. Indeed, one might view the calculations
here as simply taking a logical step prior to other work in its drawing
out an interpretation to the indexes used in studies of inequality and
growth.
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7 Technical Appendix
If data existed on individual incomes accruing to diﬀerent economic
agents, at each point in time, then the empirical analysis would be
straightforward. One can directly estimate the entire income distri-
bution across agents on the planet, and characterize its dynamics
through time. The problem, however, is that such data are unavail-
able and are unlikely to be produced anytime soon.
I develop here an alternative empirical framework that is general,
ﬂexible, and convenient. The approach is designed to be capable of
incorporating a wide range of alternative distributional hypotheses,
and a variety of measurements on diﬀerent characteristics of income
inequality. Thus, the empirical analysis is intended to apply readily
as more and better data on income inequality characteristics become
available.
I seek to uncover characteristics of the global distribution of in-
come across individuals. We know characteristics of income distri-
butions within countries, over time for a number of countries. A
traditional approach then to analyzing inequalities across progres-
sively larger subsets of individual incomes—proceeding up from yet
ﬁner subgroups—is to ask if the inequality index aggregates (e.g.,
Milanovic, 2002). The approach I take here diﬀers. It begins from
noting that if we had the actual distribution Fj,t for economy j at
time t, where the population size is Pj,t, then the worldwide income
distribution FW,t, in a world of economies j = 1, 2, . . . , N , is
FW,t(y) = P−1W,t
N∑
j=1
Fj,t(y)× Pj,t, y ∈ (0,∞) (2)
with the world population
PW,t =
N∑
j=1
Pj,t.
Diﬀerentiating (2) with respect to y gives the implied density for the
worldwide distribution of income as the weighted average of individual
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country income distribution densities:
fW,t(y) =
N∑
j=1
fj,t(y)× (Pj,t/PW,t) , y ∈ (0,∞). (3)
Knowing the distribution FW means we can calculate directly all
the inequality indexes we wish—whether or not particular indexes
aggregate becomes irrelevant.
7.1 Estimating individual income distributions
Given the quantities on the right of equation (3) the worldwide income
distribution is straightforward to calculate. However, the individual
distributions Fj,t are, generally, unknown. Instead, typically, we have
data on a number of diverse functionals of them—e.g., Gini coeﬃ-
cients, quintile shares, averages, and so on. This subsection describes
obtaining an estimate for Fj from data on such functionals.
Since the remainder of this section concentrates on what happens
with a single economy, the j subscript is taken as understood and
deleted to ease notation.
Fix an economy j. Suppose in each period t, we observe real-
izations on (Pt,Xt), where P is the population size and Xt ∈ Rd is
a d-dimensional vector of functionals of the underlying unobservable
income distribution Ft and population Pt. For example, when the
ﬁrst entry of Xt is the average or per capita income, then
X1,t =
∫ +∞
−∞
y dFt(y) =
∫ +∞
0
y dFt(y).
Let (R,R) denote the pair comprised of the real line R together
with the collection R of its Borel sets. LetB(R,R) denote the Banach
space of bounded ﬁnitely-additive set functions on the measurable
space (R,R) endowed with total variation norm:
∀ ϕ in B(R,R) : |ϕ| = sup
∑
k
|ϕ(Ak)|,
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where the supremum in this deﬁnition is taken over all
{Ak : j = 1, 2, . . . , n}
ﬁnite measurable partitions of R.
Distributions on R can be identiﬁed with probability measures
on (R,R). Those are, in turn, just countably-additive elements in
B(R,R) assigning value 1 to the entire space R. Let B denote the
Borel sigma-algebra generated by the open subsets (relative to total
variation norm topology) of B(R,R). Then (B,B) is another mea-
surable space.
Write the vector of potentially-observable functionals as a collec-
tion
Tl : (B× R,B×R)→ (R,R), l = 1, 2, . . . , d
(where B × R denotes the sigma-algebra generated by the Carte-
sian product of B and R). Thus, for distribution Ft associated with
probability measure ϕt ∈ (B,B),
Xl,t = Tl(ϕt, Pt), l = 1, 2, . . . , d. (4)
Without loss or ambiguity, I will also write Tl(Ft, Pt) to denote the
right hand side of (4). Write T to denote the vector of observed
functionals, i.e.,
T(Ft, Pt) = (T1(Ft, Pt),T2(Ft, Pt), . . . ,Td(Ft, Pt))′.
Assume, ﬁnally, that the distribution Ft is known up to a p-
dimensional vector θt ∈ Rp,
Ft = F (·|θt) def= Fθt. (5)
(In equation (5) the symbol F is used to mean a number of diﬀer-
ent mathematical objects, but this will be without ambiguity, as the
context will always be revealing.)
Equation (5) restricts in two distinct ways. First, the functional
form Ft is assumed known. Second, time variation in the sequence
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of distributions Ft is assumed mediated entirely through the ﬁnite-
dimensional parameter vector θt.
If for some θ∗t , distribution Fθt is the true model, then
Tl(Fθ∗t , Pt) = Xl,t, l = 1, 2, . . . , d.
At ﬁxed t, deﬁne the estimator θˆt for θ∗t as
θˆt
def= argmin
θ∈Rp
(T(Fθ, Pt)−Xt)′Ω (T(Fθ, Pt)−Xt) ,
Ω d× d positive deﬁnite.
(6)
Each diﬀerent weighting matrix Ω—including, notably, the identity
matrix—produces a diﬀerent estimator. Under standard regularity
conditions (as in GMM or related analogue estimation, e.g., Hansen,
1982 or Manski, 1988), each Ω-associated estimator is consistent when
Xt is itself replaced with a consistent estimator for the underlying
population quantity. Moreover, deﬁning the minimand
QXt(θ) = (T(Fθ, Pt)−Xt)′Ω (T(Fθ, Pt)−Xt) , (7)
and denoting θt,0 as the probability limit of (6), standard reasoning
using
θˆt − θt,0 = −
(
d2Q
dθdθ′
∣∣∣∣
θt,0
)−1
dQ
dθ
∣∣∣∣
θt,0
allows a limit distribution theory for these estimators, provided the
quantities Xt have a characterizable distribution around their under-
lying population counterparts.
Using θt from the estimating equation (6) in (5) gives an estima-
tor for Ft in each economy j. Plugging the result for each j in turn
into (2)–(3) gives an estimator for the worldwide distribution of in-
come. Tracking θj,t as they evolve through time then gives worldwide
individual income distribution dynamics.
Section 7.4 below provides some explicit analytically worked-out
examples of this procedure.
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7.2 Alternative functionals Tl
This subsection provides examples of some candidate functionals Tl.
When observations on them are available—as assumed in the nota-
tion of section 7.1 above—they are readily used in estimating and
characterizing the distributions Fj,t. Conversely, if they are not ob-
servable but an estimate of Fj,t is available, then estimates for Tl can,
instead, be induced.
For mean or per capita income, take
E(F, P ) def=
∫ ∞
−∞
y dF(y). (8)
The Gini coeﬃcient is standard in analysis of income inequality. As-
sociate with it the functional
IG(F, P ) def=
[
2−1E(F)]−1 ∫ ∞
−∞
(
F(y)− 1
2
)
y dF(y) (9)
(see, e.g., Cowell, 2000).
A diﬀerent set of functionals standard in inequality analyses is
the set of cumulative quintile shares. To deﬁne these, set for integer
i from 1 to 4,
Y0.2i(F, P )
def= sup
y∈R
{y |F(y) ≤ 0.2i} (10)
S0.2i(F)
def=
(∫ Y0.2i(F,P )
−∞
y dF(y)
)
× E(F, P )−1. (11)
The ﬁrst of these, equation (10), deﬁnes the (20 × i)-th percentile
income level; the left-hand side is also known as the i-th quintile.
The pair (10)–(11) generalizes to arbitrary percentile shares, but in
practice the more general versions are rarely used (see, however, (12),
(13), and (17) below).
Concepts (9)–(11) are those traditionally used in studies on in-
equality. Reliable observations on them are now widely available
across time and economies (Deininger and Squire, 1996).
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Recently, Milanovic (2002) has used household data to construct
within-decile average incomes across many diﬀerent countries. These
ﬁt within our framework as follows. Deﬁne
Y0.1i(F, P )
def= sup
y∈R
{y |F(y) ≤ 0.1i} , i = 0, 1, . . . , 9, (12)
and let
E0.1i(F, P ) def=
∫ Y0.1i
Y0.1×(i−1)
y dF(y), i = 1, . . . , 9,
E1(F, P ) def=
∫ ∞
Y0.9
y dF(y).
(13)
Similar to (10) above, equation (12) deﬁnes the (10× i)-th percentile
income level, with the left-hand side also known as the i-th decile. The
analysis in Milanovic (2002) can thus be merged with that below if we
use the decile averages E0.1i from (13) (or even the deciles themselves
Y0.1i in (12)) as candidate Tl’s.
Yet other ways to extract or summarize information from (F, P )
are relevant when interest lies in poverty speciﬁcally (e.g., Ravallion,
1997; Ravallion and Chen, 1997; World Bank, 1990) Fix a low but
otherwise arbitrary level of income Y , and let:
HCY (F, P )
def= F(Y ) =
∫ Y
−∞
dF(y). (14)
Equation (14) gives a poverty headcount index, i.e., the fraction of
population below a given income level Y . Record also the absolute
size of the population with those incomes:
PY (F, P )
def= P × F(Y ). (15)
Finally, deﬁne:
PGIY (F, P )
def=
∫ Y
−∞ y dF(y)
Y
. (16)
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This is a poverty gap index, i.e., a (normalized) average income dis-
tance from a given income level Y .
When researchers are interested in whether a gap is emerging
between groups of high-income and low-income individuals, a concept
more useful than just inequality is polarization (e.g., Esteban and
Ray, 1994; Quah, 1993, 1997; Wolfson, 1994) To obtain a functional
that captures such an eﬀect, follow the notation of (10) and let Y0.5
denote the median
Y0.5(F, P )
def= sup
y∈R
{
y |F(y) ≤ 1
2
}
, (17)
and then, using (8), (9), and (17), deﬁne a polarization index
Pz(F, P ) def=
[
(1− IG)E −
∫ Y0.5
−∞ y dF(y)∫ Y0.5
−∞ dF(y)
]
× 2
Y0.5
. (18)
The ﬁrst term in square brackets is the Gini-adjusted per capita in-
come; the second is the average level of incomes below the median
(this is a special case of a conditional expectation that will appear
again below). The greater this separation, the higher will be the value
taken by the polarization index in (18).
All the functionals so far considered—apart from PY in (15)—vary
only with the distribution F, and not the size of the population P .
The next functional takes both into account; it describes a dynamic
property of the evolving distributions. From the headcount index
(14), one might be interested in the rate of ﬂow of people past the
ﬁxed income level Y . This is
FlY (Fθt , Pt)
def= − d
dt
(Fθt(Y ) · Pt) (19)
= −
[
Pt
d
dt
Fθt(Y ) + Fθt(Y )
dPt
dt
]
.
Equation (19) shows interaction among a range of factors, including
in particular per capita income growth E˙/E and static, point-in-time
inequality IG. I will use this simultaneous relationship below in sec-
tions 7.4.1 and 7.4.2. Using diﬀerent techniques, it is exactly this
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interaction that Ravallion (1997) studies for developing countries, us-
ing household survey data with direct observations on FlY .
The examples above should by certainly not be viewed to be ex-
haustive. I have given explicit Tl calculations only for those function-
als readily found in the empirical literature and for which observations
are available. As progressively more reﬁned income-distribution data
are constructed, the reasoning here is easily extended to take those
into account.
7.3 Distribution F as organizing principle
As the discussion makes clear, the approach in this paper is to use
the distribution dynamics in FW,t as the core concept around which
I organize all subsequent discussion. Equation (2) is the key compo-
sitional relation from individual economies to the world. All induced
statistics—Gini coeﬃcients, poverty headcounts, poverty gap indexes,
polarization indexes, and so on—derive from it. In this exercise, it
is not key whether those statistics retain compositional integrity, or
have an axiomatic justiﬁcation, or satisfy other reasonable criteria.
They are not special in this analysis. I use them below because they
are easily interpretable and are standard in discussions on income
distributions, thus allowing to reduce the dimensionality of (the in-
formation in) estimated distribution dynamics. As formulated here,
when independently available, these statistics can be used to augment
the estimation (6); when not, they can be straightforwardly derived
from an estimate of Fj,t. Everything centers on the distributions.
Admittedly, backing out estimates of individual-economy distri-
butions Fj,t—as in equation (6)—might be viewed as a contrived
problem. If a researcher had the original individual-level incomes
data, then Fj,t (and thus FW,t) could be estimated directly by stan-
dard methods (e.g., Milanovic, 2002; Silverman, 1981). One should
never need to construct any of (9)–(19), and go through (6), to char-
acterize the distribution Fj,t. It is because such individual-level data
are not readily available—instead statistical agencies have calculated
and made available only diﬀerent, aggregative statistics of the under-
lying data—that we are led to estimation by (6).
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By the same token, one might wish to take care not to view θ
as “deep structural parameters” in any sense of the term. Instead,
a useful perspective is to treat the θ’s as simply convenient ways—
hyperparameters—to keep control on the high-dimensional calcula-
tions that would be otherwise involved in tracing through distribu-
tion dynamics. The analysis in this paper is obviously not one that
sets out to test a multivariate regression or simultaneous equations
model. It studies historical tendencies, not—to a large degree—the
eﬀects of artiﬁcial growth paths and inequality dynamics.
Standard econometric analysis of (6)–(7) allows consistency and
limit distribution results for the hyperparameters θ. Measurement
errors in the data Xt, in sample, do not logically pose any diﬃculties.
However, whether Xt can be guaranteed to converge to underlying
population quantities, and in a manner where the limiting distribu-
tion can be characterized falls outside the domain of analysis in this
paper.
Finally, to state the obvious, this approach is one that makes sense
when the individual distributions Fj,t are comparable. If they are not,
then the whole enterprise of trying to study worldwide inequality is
ﬂawed from the beginning, regardless of the approach taken.
7.4 Induced statistics and parametric examples
I now turn to some explicit parametric examples to provide intuition
for the remainder of the analysis. In describing the distribution dy-
namics, it is useful to establish some additional notation.
Suppose that in a given economy per capita income E increases
at a positive constant proportional growth rate:
E˙/E = ξ > 0. (20)
I will wish to compare dynamically evolving income distributions
against a ﬁxed (feasible and low, but otherwise arbitrary) threshold
income level Y . One statistic we will be concerned with in particular
is the rate of ﬂow of people past Y , i.e., equation (19). We will be
interested in the value of (19) when inequality, as measured by the
–33–
One third of the world’s growth and inequality
Gini coeﬃcient IG say, is held constant. Alternatively, we will be
interested in ﬁnding how fast IG has to change to set (19) to zero.
Write Fθ to denote a parametrized income distribution function,
and let fθ be its associated density function:
Fθ(y) =
∫ y
−∞
fθ(y˜) dy˜, y ∈ R.
Any given distribution also implies the conditional expectation func-
tion
Eθ
(
Y
∣∣∣ Y in set A) =
∫
A y dFθ(y)∫
A dFθ(y)
.
This is the expectation of a random variable Y , distributed Fθ, con-
ditional on Y falling in set A of possible values.
I will abuse notation by using subscripts such as N(θ), L(θ), or
P(θ) to the functions F, f, and E, to denote speciﬁc functional forms—
in this case the Normal, the log Normal, and the Pareto Type 1, distri-
butions, respectively. In the general case (with no explicit functional
form restriction), the subscript will be simply θ.
To begin discussing explicitly parametrized distributions, record
that the Normal distribution characterized by mean θ1 and variance
θ2 has density
fN(θ)(y) = (2πθ2)
−1/2 × exp
{
− 1
2θ2
(y − θ1)2
}
, θ2 > 0.
The standard Normal sets θ1 = 0 and θ2 = 1 so that then
FN(0,1)(y) =
∫ y
−∞
(2π)−1/2 exp
{
−1
2
y˜2
}
dy˜.
7.4.1 Log Normal
The Log Normal distribution is widely used in traditional studies of
personal income distributions. Its density is
fL(θ)(y) = (2πθ2)
−1/2 · y−1
× exp
{
− 1
2θ2
(log y − θ1)2
}
, θ2 > 0, y > 0.
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For this distribution the T functionals in (8)–(11) of section 7.2 are:
E(FL(θ)) = exp(θ1 +
1
2
θ2),
IG(FL(θ)) = 2× FN(0,1)( θ1/22 /
√
2 )− 1,
S0.2i(FL(θ)) = FL(θ1+θ2,θ2)(Y0.2i(FL(θ))),
with
Y0.2i(FL(θ)) = exp
{
F−1N(0,1)(0.2i) · θ
1/2
2 + θ1
}
.
An alternative expression for the cumulative quintile share is
S0.2i(FL(θ)) = FN(0,1)
(
log Y0.2i − (θ1 + θ2)
θ2
1/2
)
= FN(0,1)
(
F−1N(0,1)(0.2i) − θ
1/2
2
)
.
If estimation (6) used only E and IG, and ignored information on
other elements of T (or if those observations were unavailable), then
an exact analytical formula for the estimator can be given:
θˆ2 =
[
F−1N(0,1) ((IG + 1)/2)
]2 × 2,
θˆ1 = log E − θˆ2/2.
These can be used, in any case, as starting values in an iterative solu-
tion to (6). Heston and Summers (1999) used these as the estimates
for their study.
Explicit formulas for some of the dynamics are then available:
E˙/E = θ˙1 + 12 θ˙2,
I˙G/IG =
fN(0,1)([θ2/2]1/2)
2FN(0,1([θ2/2]1/2)− 1
· (θ2/2)1/2 × θ˙2/θ2,
and
d
dt
FL(θ)(Y ) =
∫ Y
0
d
dt
fL(θ) dy.
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(The Pareto case below will permit explicit calculation for all the
dynamics of interest, in particular, for all the numerical results in
Section 4. Other distributional hypotheses will, as with the log Nor-
mal, require at least some of the results calculated numerically as
closed-form expressions are intractable.)
When IG is held ﬁxed, θ˙2 is zero. Then
θ˙1 = E˙/E = ξ,
so that for any ﬁxed y,
d
dt
fL(θ)(y) = −(2πθ2)−1/2 · y−1 exp
{
− 1
2θ2
(log y − θ1)2
}
× (−θ−12 ) · (log y − θ1)(−θ˙1)
= θ−1/22 fL(θ)(y)×
(
log y − θ1√
θ2
)
θ˙1.
But then,
− d
dt
FL(θ)(Y ) = −θ−1/22
(∫ Y
0
(
log y − θ1√
θ2
)
fL(θ)(y)
)
× ξ
= −θ−1/22 EN(0,1)
(
Z
∣∣∣ Z ≤ log Y − θ1√
θ2
)
× FN(0,1)
(
log Y − θ1√
θ2
)
· ξ.
With ﬁxed inequality at a constant IG, this expression says that the
ﬂow of population past a given threshold level Y is proportional to the
aggregate growth rate ξ. The constant of proportionality, moreover,
is easily calculated from knowledge of θ.
The value of I˙G/IG that sets the ﬂow dFL(θ)(Y )/dt to zero can be
obtained only by numerical simulation.
7.4.2 Pareto (Type 1)
A diﬀerent widely-used parametrization for personal income distribu-
tions is the Pareto (Type 1) distribution:
FP(θ)(y) = 1− (θ1y−1)θ2 , θ1 > 0, y ≥ θ1, θ2 > 1,
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with density
fP(θ)(y) =
{
0 if y ≤ 0,
θ2(θ1y−1)θ2y−1 otherwise.
The implied T functionals in (8)–(11) of section 7.2 then are:
E(FP(θ)) = (θ2 − 1)−1θ2θ1,
IG(FP(θ)) = (2θ2 − 1)−1,
Y0.2i(FP(θ)) = FP(θ1,θ2−1)(S0.2i)
with
S0.2i(FP(θ)) = (1− 0.2i)−1/θ2 · θ1.
As with the log Normal above (similarly having two parameters), an
exact formula for the estimator (6) is available when only E and IG
are observed:
θˆ2 = (1 + IG−1)/2,
θˆ1 = (1− θˆ−12 )E .
In this case the dynamics in θ and (E , IG) can be easily seen to be
related by:
E˙/E = θ˙1
θ1
− (θ2 − 1)−1 θ˙2
θ2
,
I˙G/IG =
( −2θ2
2θ2 − 1
)
θ˙2
θ2
.
Moreover, direct calculation shows
− d
dt
FP(θ)(Y ) =
d
dt
[(
θ1
Y
)θ2]
=
(
1− FP(θ)(Y )
)
θ2 ×
[
θ˙1
θ1
+ log
(
θ1
Y
)
θ˙2
θ2
]
.
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When inequality in the form of IG is held ﬁxed, we have
θ˙1
θ1
=
E˙
E = ξ
and
− d
dt
FP(θ)(Y ) =
(
1− FP(θ)(Y )
)
θ2 · ξ.
Alternatively, to ﬁx FP(θ)(Y ) instead, require
θ˙1/θ1 = − log (θ1/Y ) θ˙2/θ2,
or
θ˙2/θ2 = −
[
log (θ1/Y ) + (θ2 − 1)−1
]−1
ξ.
To achieve this, we need
I˙G/IG =
(
2θ2
2θ2 − 1
)[
log (θ1/Y ) + (θ2 − 1)−1
]−1
ξ. (21)
Equation (21) shows, at a given aggregate growth rate ξ, the rate
of change in inequality required to hold ﬁxed the proportion of the
population below income Y . The increase in IG is proportional to ξ.
When Y is suﬃciently low, i.e., when
FP(θ)(Y ) < 1− exp
{ −θ2
θ2 − 1
}
(which happens to be the case of interest), the constant of propor-
tionality is necessarily positive.
For the purposes of this paper, the log Normal and Pareto cases
are interesting only because they permit explicit (closed-form) analy-
ses of the distribution dynamics of interest. They provide intuition for
how the general case will work. In the latter, typically only numerical
solutions are available.
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7.5 Data
This paper merges data from Deininger and Squire (1996), Summers
and Heston (1991), and UNU (2000). The updated and expanded
inequality data in Deininger and Squire (2002) are not, as of this
writing, yet distributed for general use.
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